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Can the methods and spirit of the New Political Economy be
used to explain common features of Third World experience --
such features as the extensive growth of government relative to
the private sector, the intensity of trade restrictions and the
import substitution syndrome, the urban bias of economic policy
and resource allocation, and the heavy dependence on foreign
capital?
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dPoly,  Planning,  and Research  |
Maroeconomic  Adjustment
and  Growth
Protcctionism and industrial regulation are two  Using the methods and spirit of the New
topics in which the interplay of politics and  Political Ecunomy, one can develop a theory of
economics is so strong that one wonders why the  the autonomous state, applying it to the condi-
intellectual merger between the two approaches  tions prevailing in different developing coun-
- in the New Political Economy - has taken  tries.  Using this approach makes possible an
so long.  explanation of several major featt  es of Third
World experience:  the extensive growth of
The literature of the New Political Economy  govemrnment  relative to the private sector, the
largely postulates a framework of political  intensity of trade restrictions and the associated
institutions and behavior like those in the ad-  phenomenon of the import substitution syn-
vanced industrial countries, especially the  drome, the urban bias of economic policy and
United States.  The state is seen as passive, and  resource allocation, and the degree of depend-
the emphasis is on the activities of interest  ence on foreign capital.
groups to gct lcgislation favorable to themselves
passed by political parties whose only concem is  After describing the emergence of the state
electoral success.  in Westem Europe and the contemporary Third
World, Findlay presents an economic model of
Most developing countries are ruled by  the state, in which lie tries to integrate its
military juntas or one-party dictatorships.  One  productive and predatory features.
doesn't see in them the kind of equilibrium
between contending interest groups that charac-  He applies the insights from that analysis to
terizes the New Political Economy.  some simple general equilibrium models of trade
theory, to consider the activities of a public
Organized private interests in civil society  sector within open economies in which trade
can be said to emasculate the state in industrial-  taxes provide the main source of revenue.
ized nations.  In contrast, the state in developing
countries disproponionately dominates (often  He applies his analysis to Turkey (which
represses) a weak and fragmented civil society  went from surplus-maximizing traditional
(often in the interests of a minority that controls  monarchy to developmental dictatorship), India
the bureaucratic apparatus).  (a successor state to a gunpowder empire),
Africa (with its marketing boards), Latin Amer-
Is the New Political Economy relevant in the  ica (whose diverse economies tend to go through
Third World?  three stages:  o;;garchy, populism, and bureau-
cratic-authoritarianism), and the four Far Eastem
Yes, says Findlay.  newly industrializing economies (Hong Kong,
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, the star perform-
ers in development).
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during  my visit.THE NEW POLfTICAL ECONOMY!
It's  Explanatory  Power  as  Related  to  LDCs
The term New  Polidcal  Economy  presumably  refers  to the extensive  work  done
over the last two  or three  decodes  under  a variety  of names,  prominent  among  which  have
been  "public  choi.ce"'  "rent-seeking",  "directly-unproductive  profit-seeldng  activities"  and,
most recently,  "new institutional  economics".  The pioneers  have  been Anthony  Downs,
Mancur  Olson,  James  Buchanan,  Gordon  Tullock  and Douglass  North,  whose work  has
ated  increasing  attention  from  economists  specializing  in more  traditonal areas  such  as
innational  trade  and industrial  orgnization. Prtectonism  and industral  regulation  are
two topics  where  the interplay  of politics  and  economics  is so strong  that  it is surprising
how  long it has taken  for the inteliectual  merger  between  economic  and  political  approaches
to occur.,
For the most part this  literature  has posuaed  a framework  of political  institutions
and behavior  that  coesponds to that  of the advanced  industrial  countries  and,  even  more
specifically,  to mhat  prevailing  in the contempomry  United  States. The "state"  as such  is
passive  and the emphasis  is on the activities  of interest  groups  to obtain  legislation
favorable  to themselves  through  the intemediation  of political  parties  whose  only  concern
is with electoral  success. Other  work  has been  concerned  with  voting schemes  and
problems  of constitutional  design,  which  also presumes  "pluralist"  dernocracies  of the
Anglo-Saxon  or Swss type.
it is of course  an unfortunate  fact  that  most  LDCs  today  are  rued by militaiy  juntas
or one-party  dictatorships  of one kind  or another,  in none of which  does  it appear  that
economic  policy  is decided  by the kind  of equilibrium  between  contending  interest  groups
that  is such  a prominent  featume  of the  New  Political  Economy.  The state  tends  to dominate
"civil  wiety",  which  is weak  and fragmented  in the LDCs,  whereas  the rich  texture  oforganized private intsts  in civil society emasculates the state as an autonomous  entity in
the context of advanced industrial democracies. Hence, I suppose, the reason for Gerry
Meier to raise the question with which this paper will be concerned, of whether or not the
New Political Economy is relevant for the LDCs. My answer, in short, is going to be a
resounding "yes", despite the fact just noted that most of the existing literature on the New
Political Economy generally  presumes political conditions vastly different from those
prevailing in the typical LDC
The bc  reason for the positive posidon that I have taken on this question is that
one can use the methods and the spirit of the New Political Economy to develop a theory of
the autonomous state, which can then be applied to condidons prevailing in LDCs of
different types.  Thc use of this approach makes possible a parsimonious and hopefully
credible explanation of several major features of Third World experience. These are the
extensive growth of government relative to the private :ector, the pervasiveness  of
"corruption" in varied forms, the intensity of trade restrctions and the associated
phenomenon of the "import substitution syndrome", the "urban bias" of economic policy
and resource allocation and the degree of dependence on foreign capitaL
Since the notion of the "state" is going to be central for my argument the first
section will be a brief survey and analysis  of the emergence of the state in the experience of
Western Europe and its nature and charcter  in the contemporary  Third Wor]kL  The next
section is an economic model of the state, which will attempt the task of integmting  the
"productive" and "predatory" aspects of this institution. The third secdon will apply the
insights of this apprch  to the state to some simple general equilibrium models of the trade
theory type which will consider the activities of a public sector within  open economies in
which trade taxes provide the main source of revenue. A final section will offer comments
on the relations between the present analysis and recent work on the political economy of
some selected countries that might be of general interest.
2To avoid  misunderstanding  I should  stess that  the objective  of this paper  is strictly
"positive"  in natuc, i.e. to present  hypotheses  and models  based  on the insights  of the
New  Political  Economy  to see how  far they  can go towards  being  consistent  with at least
some  of the major  "stylized  facts"  of Third  World  experience.  It is s  intended  as yet
another  diatribe  against  state  intervention  and in praise  of the "magic  of the market". The
whole  question  of what La  the appropriate  role of the state  in economic  development,  the
"normative"  issue, is left entirely  aside,  thought  of course  the analysis  presented  may
hopelly  have some  relevant  implications  for any attempt  to address  it.
3I.  The Antonnmv  of  the State
(i) "Bringing  the State  Back  In" is the tide  of an interesting  recent  book  edited  by
Theda  Skocpol  and others. 2 The common  theme  that Skocpol  finds  in much  recent  social
science  literure,  and which  is further  emphasized  in the  papers  of the edited  volume,  is the
rediscovery  by a number  of authors,  Marxists  as wel as  "mainstream"  scholars,  of the
"autenomy  of the state",  which  makes  it necessary  to treat  it as a dynamic  independent
force  instead  of as a passive  agent  of society  at  large  and its various  interest  groups
contending  "horizontally",  as in libeal pluaist  theoy,  or as the "executive  committee  of
the  ruling  class"  as in vulgar  Marxism There  are many  theoretical  avenues  through  which
this  issue of the autonomy  of the state  can be addessed,  which  are not  only not mutually
exclusive but which can possibly contribute to a wider  Marxists,  foilowing
Engels  in O  heami1y  Privai  and.Ui  Sate and  Marx  in his  Eightamh
Riirofn  is  NAUWa  look to situations  in which class interests  achieve  something
of a deadlock  in their natual antagonism,  leaving  it open  to a dynasty,  dictator  as rling
clique  of some  s'rt to pursue  independent  policies  of aggrandizement  that  may  diverge
from  the interests  of each  of the classes  themselves,  though  of course  a prudent  ruler  would
be careful  to play  off one group  against  another  by partial  concessions  and favors, Some
of these  autonomous  "ends"  might be the wealth  and privileges  of the ruling  circles,
military  glory,  or what is most likely  in the modem  world,  an enlargement  of the st's
bureaucradc  apparatus  for its own  sake. The sociological  distincdon  between  "latent"  and
"manifest"  motived  objectives  is of cowse  crucial  in this regid.  'Economic
development",  "national  securty,  "socialist  construction"  are  all labels  that  have  been  used
with greater  or less sincrty  but all of which  opeate at the "manifest"  level. The  task  of
the social  scientist  should  be to penetrate  these  myths,  while  recognizing  their  force,  and to
reach  into the "latent"  core  of individual  or group  self-interest  that  underlies  them. 3
4Perhaps the mort natural approach for an economist to the problem is in terms of
the "principal-agent"  famework.  Thus whether one views the government as the agent of
"the people", as in Locke or Rousseau, or of the "rulin  ,Iass" only as in thc cruder
Marxian varianr, the principal in both cases has the difficult problem of "monitoring" the
activities of the agent to see whether or not they are in keeping with the implicit social
contract that underlies both eases. The conventional principal-agent  problem is of course
enormously compounded by the fact that the "agene' in this case is empowered with the
"monopoly of the use of force,  that is necessary for the enforcement of the conventional
types of contract between principals and agents. Once the people, or the bourgeoisie, or
the proletariat appoint or accept a "guardian" then who is to guard them from the guardian?
Recognition of this problem probably led Hobbes to his conception of the sovereign as
necessarly  absolute.
(ii)  The "modem state" as we know it evolved in the West during the course of
a miilennium from tAc  feudalism of the Carolingian  empire, through the "sdndel  ' and
the absolutist state to the constitutional state of the nineteenth century, culminating in the
universal suffrage and the welfare state of today.4 Throughout this evolution the state at
each phase was intimately involved with the evolution of civil society, both  shaping and
being shaped by it. Even in its most "primidve" form, the feudalism of the Middle Ages, it
was marked by an acknowledgment of the limitations of the mler in relaton  to his subjects.
Lord and vassal both shared in the status of knighthood, and were ,herefore in one sense
"equals" though of different degree in terms of circumstances and power. Magna Carta is
the best known butby no means the only acknowledgement  by a  sovereign  of the limits
beyond which he could not encroach on the rights of his aristocratic vassals. The urban
merchants and craftsmen in the rising towns of the Middle Ages were also able to secue
rights and privileges for themselves in relation to the crown, in exchange for the financial
assmstance  they were able to provide the monarchs in thei  struggles to pa  the unruly
barons. The Church, furthermore, had always been a powerful institution whose vast
5landed  wealth augmented  its spiritual  influence  on civil society. Thus the Standostaat  or
"Estate  Society"  was marked  by a "dualism"  of power  between  crown  and estates,  as Otto
von Gierke  emphasized.
Despite  their  appellation,  the  "absolutist"  states  of early  modem  Europe  were
constrained  sharply  by the historical  circumstances  within  which  they  emerged,  with its
inherited  struture of rights  and privileges  that  the  various  segments  of civil society
enjoyed.  Thus although  the fact that  the Estates  General  of Frnce were not summoned
between  1618  and 1789  is generally  taken  as indicating  the  power  of the Bourbons  to rule
unhindered,  the odter  side  of the uoin is that there  were  "no new  taxes"  that they  could
leIy.  They  had to supplement  the rising  yield  frm  the traditional  taxes  by a variety  of
expedients,  such as the sale of offices,  the farming  of the tax revenues  and of course  the
issue  of public  debt. All of these  crated trouble  for the future  since  they  wae
accompanied  by the granting  of exemptions  and  privileges  to wider  segments  of society.
The very  efficiency  of the IntwMfla, the royal  officials  who  admiistered France,  most of
whom  v,ere  a meritocracy  of "new men",  undermined  the social  basis  of the Ancien
Regime,  as de Tocqueville  pointed  out, since  it rendered  the aristwcracy  superfluous  as a
"functional"  class. The French  Revolution  continued  the trend  towards  a more  centralized
administration  but with the extension  of civil  rights  to the '"people"  as a whole. In England
the Whig  oligarchy  that  ruled  since 1689  grdually extended  the fianchise  and reformed  the
electoral  system  in the nineteenth  century.
The "modern  state"  can be thought  of as a contrimce or invention  of administave
technology,  that  is.apable of being  transferred  or imported  into societies  that  originally  did
not possess  it. As it moved  eastward  in Europe,  to the German  prncipalities  and Russia,  it
became  more  authoritarian  in nature. The historian  Mark  Raeff  (1983)  has examined  the
concept  of The Well-Ordered  Police  State  in his fascinating  book  of the same  name. In the
German  principalities,  particularly  Prussia,  the rulers  established  bureaucracies  that
meticulously  attempted  to regulate  civil society  in the  spheres  of educadon  and the economy
6in order  to develop  along  more  modern  lines,  which  at that  time of course  meant  imitating
the French.  This '"diffusion"  of the modem  state  worked  relatively  well  in the Germaii  case
despite  its authoritarian  character  and  legacy,  since  civil society  itself  was sE  Ificiently
developed  to respond  positively  to the detailed  regulations  and intervention.  In the  case  of
Russia,  however,  the succession  of "revolutions  from above",  from Peter  the Great  down
to Mikhail  Gorbachev,  have  yet to succeed  in transforming  civil society  up t0 the westem
European  level,  despite  the bloody  sacrifices  that  have  been  imposed  on the  people  in the
attempt.
(iii)  If the modem  state,  which  attained  its "ideal"  form in post-Revoludonary
France,  was modified  and distorted  in its journey  eastwards  to Germany  and Russia,  it has
certaiy  spawned  an exotic  new  stwain  in its recent  journey  "south"  to the fomnerly  colonial
temtmries  that attained  their  independence  in Asia  and  Africa  in the aftemath of World  War
IL Particularly  in the former  British  colonies,  the modern  constitutional  state  with its full
panoply  of checks  and balances,  privileges  and safeguards  was left behind  lock,  stock  and
barrel  by the departing  representadves  of the crown,  as the final  culmination  of decades  if
not centuries  of "'reparation for self-government",  along  with the new flags  and  national
anthems. If the Western  state  took  a millennium  to develop  from " feudal  anarchy"  to
constitutionalism  the  hird World states  have  sadly  given  the impression,  in many  cases,  of
running  the film  backwards,  at an accelerated  rate  that  covers  the same  distance  in less than
half a century. Whle there  are many  notable  exceptions  to this gloomy  spectacle  it is fair to
say that the recod has on the whole  been  arather dismal  one,  especially  in the  light of the
wave  of hope  and ethusiasm that  the national  independence  movements  initiaUy  aroused.
Som conservative  critics  have  said  that  the colonial  powers  left too soon,  before
their  "civilizing  mission"  was fully  accomplished.  This  argument  is not convincing,
particularly  when  one notes  that  the longer  and harder  the colonial  power  resisted  the
demand  for independence  the  more  violent  and  radical  has been  the regime  that  eventually
took over. Another,  more  pernicious  argument  has been  that  Third  World  people  do not
7share  the values  of individual  freedom  and  civil liberty  with  the West,  and are thus
reverting  to the mek acceptance  of despotic  rule  with which  they  are familiar  from their
pre-colonial  past. It is hani to maintain  this  view  in the light  of the dramatic  popular
protests  in the Philippines,  South  Korea,  Burma,  Algeria  and China  that have  all taken
place  recently.
What then  is the problem?  Why has not the  modern  constitudonal  state  "taken"  in its
transplantation  into the less  developed  world?  The basic  answer  is that  there  is a
disproportion  in the  Third  World  context  between  the state  and the development  of "civil
society",  such that  the forms  of the state  are perverted  into making  it an instrument  of
repression  of the mass  of the people Athe  interests  of a small  minority  that  attain  control  of
the  bureaucratic  apparatus.  This minority  is not  defined,  as in Maxism by its ownership  or
control  of the means  of producdon  but by its control  over the "means  of administration",
which  ultimately  consists  of course  in the effective  monopoly  of the use of force. The
closest  approximation  to a Marxian  'ruling class"  view of the state  is in parts of Central  and
South  America,  where  land-owning  elites  exercise  domination  through  political  parties  that
closely  represel  ' their  interests,  backed  by armies  whose  officer  corps  come from  the same
social  stratumn
In their  effort  to chateize  the  Third  World  State  social  scientists  have  turned  to
Max  Weber's typology  of authority  under  the rubrics  of "patimonial"',  "charismatic"  and
"rational-legal".  The first generation  of nationalist  leaders  tended  to be striking  figures,
such as Kemal,  Nasser,  Nehru,  Nkrumah  and others. These were natural  candidates  for
the  "charismatic"'tegory, and indeed  some  of their  achievements  could  perhaps  only be
accounted  for in terms  of the force  of their  personalities.  Subsequent  developments  were
also sought  to be explained  by Weber's notion  of the "routinization  of charisma".  The
explanatory  power  of this  approach  seems  however  t) have  faded  along  with the  transient
glories  of the "modernizing  dictator'. A more  illuminating  application  of Weber's
categories  is Christopher  Clapham's  (1985)  concept  of "neo-patrimonialism"  a; being  the
8ge-teral  underlying  characteristic  of Third  World  states. By this  he means  the use of
modem  rational-legal  forms,  i.e. imnersonal  "universalistic"  systems  and  rules,  for private
"paricularistic"  purposes. A patrimonial  ruler  of the pure type  would  give  gifts  to his
followers  and  kinsmen  to cement  their loyalty  to him in his struggles  with his opponents,
these gifts  coming  out of his own  personal  resources,  since  such a system  would  lack  any
distinction  between  the private  and public  purse. A modem  Third  World  leader,  however,
who  wanted  to perform  essent;ally  the same  activity  of rewarding  followers  and kinsmen
would  do so typically  by assigning  them  jobs or import  licenses  or contracts  that  ostensibly
ought  to go only to those  satisfying  certain  impersonal  objective  criteria  of functional
qualificadon.
Many  widely  noted  aspects  of Third  World  expenence  fall into  place  in in the light
of this  fruitful  characterization.  The pervasiveness  of the  state  in the economy  and society
at large, and the extent  and  persistence  of economic  controls  and reguladons,  become
explicable  as maximizing  the "base"  on which  the neo-patnimonial  ruler  can reward  himself
and his followers. Admonitions  by thc IMF  and World  Bank,  universal  guardians  of the
"rational-legal"  order  in the economic  sphere,  to "get the  prices  right"  will obviously  be
resisted  directly  or by a baffage  of subterfuges Negative  extemnal  shocks  will tend  to be
responded  to by borrowing  rather  than  "adjustment',  since  the latter  would  not only lead  to
a cut in present  consumption  of the rling  group  but an erosion  of its essential  politcal
support  as well.
The  more  successful  the neo-patrimonial  state  is in its predatory  exactions  on
society,  however,j.e less the "legidmacy"  of the regime  in the  eyes of the people,  since  the
more  blatant  will be the violation  of the  publicly  proclaimed  rational-legal  norms.  The
response  to this is typically  political  repression  of varying  degrees  of severity,  depending
upon  the magnitude  of the perceived  threat. Also,  the more  valuable  the  "prize"  of the
control  of the state,  the more  intense  will be the pressure  of rival  claimants,  and so the
regime  will have  to face  the problem  of how  wide  or narrow  to make  the coalition  that
9enjoys the benefits of rule.  Much of the politics of the Third World is concerned with the
ebb and flow of thew concessions and retractions to various segments of the society.
(iv)  Despite its appeal as a charcteization  of Third World states the neo-
patrimonial concept needs to be supplemented  by some typology or classification of the
scores of actual states that at present exist in Asia, Africa and Latin America, among which
there is enormous variation in size, ideology and political organization,  even if they all
share the feature of neo-patrimonialism in some degree or other. Democracy and
dictatorship is one axis along which they might be situated, and "market-oriented" versus
"centrally planned" another, giving us four catergories  if each of these distinctions is
applied dichotomously. I had hoped that the liteature on comparative polidcs would have
produced some usable classification but have not yet come across ore.  What follows is
therefore a very rough and ready one of my own devising, which I will be very happy to
discard if a superior alternative  can be found.
1.  Traditional  Monarchies
There are a number of significant  and interestiTg  cases that can be placed in this
category.  One thinks readily of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf oil sheikdoms, Morocco and
Jordan, as well as of Ethiopia under Haile Selassie. In each of these cases the ruler could
claim legitimacy  on the basis of the traditional authority of the institudon of the monarchy
and of the dynasty in particular. In Weber's terms they correspond more to his
"patrimonial" category then to the modem mixture of this with rational-legal  norms that
Clapham stresses. Qperationally the difference is that the extracdon and redistribution of
rents from the economy and society can be made more openly, with the sanction of royal
authority, than under regimes in which this is done behind a facade of impersonal and
objective rules. In other words the distinction between the public treasury and the private
purse of the monarch is blurred.
102.  Tradiltionail Dietatorshins
In this category I would place such states as Paraguay under Stroessner, the
Dominican Republic under Trujillo, Cuba under Batista, Haiti under the Duvaliers,
Nicaragua under Somoza and the Philippines under Marcos. These share with the
monarchies the fact that they are based on absolute Nsonal  rule, but with the difference
that they lack the legidmacy of the former. Their exploitation of their respective countries is
more blatant and on a greater scale, not being tempered by the awareness of past and future
obligation that constrains a royal dynasty. They also do not seriously espouse  any
ideology of national development and can perhaps best be described by the derogatory
nubric  of"kleptocracy".
The next two categories I shall distinguish are Right and Left-wing Authoritarian
states. These states are either stnctly one-party states, with no opposition parties allowed,
or in which opposition parties have never been able to take power. The military play a
dominant role, either directly or behind the scenes, in many of them.
3.  Right-Wing  Authoritarian  States
In this category are Turkey and Egypt in the Islamic World; Argendna, Brazil, and
Chile for most of their recent history, as well as Mexico in Latin America;  Kenya, Nigeria,
Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Malawi in Africa; and a number of states in East and South-
East Asia including Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. In
some of these states such as Twkey and Thailand there has been a fair amount of
democratc politics with politcal partes competing  quite actively but in which the army
defines "the narrow limits of the possible" for the politcal arena. There is generally market
orientation in economic policy, but this is consistent  either with protectionism  and import
substitution, as in Latin America, or with outward orientation as in much of East and
South-East Asia. Corruption is on the whole much less than in the taditional dictatorships
idendfied above, and nadonal development is an explicit commitment  of the army or ruling
11party that  it genuinely  attempts  to promove,  with  varying  degrees  of success  in different
countries.
4.  Left-Wing A1thoritar1in  States
Here I would  include  the explicitly  Communist  states  of China, North  Korea,
Vietnam  and Cuba  as well  as Nicaragua  under  the Sandinistas  and Ethiopia  under  Mengistu
as close  cousins;  Algeria,  Libya,  Syria,  Iraq,  Tanzania,  Angola  and  Mozambique  in the
Middle  East  and Africa;  and  Burma  with  its military  socialism  and  one-party  state  as the
only non-communist  exarnple  in Asia  of left-wing  authoritarianism.  State  intervntion and
controls  are much  more  pervasive  in these  states  than  in their  right-wing  counterparts,
though  many  are attempting  to experiment  with  greater  reliance  on markets,  mnst  notably
China.
S.  Democratic  States
In this final  category  we have  most prominently  Lndia,  Sri Lanka,  Venezuela,  Costa
Rica,  Jamaica and  the other  former  British  West  Indies  islands,  as well  as Malta and
Mauritius.  In all of these  states  there  have  been  peaceful  truders  of state  power
determined  by elections  and a considerable  freedom  of civil  society  to modify  the authority
of the state  by the threat  of defeat  at the  polls. This,  however,  does not  mean that  the state
power  itself is weak  or insignificant.  On the contrary  the role of the state  is quite  extensive,
in producdon  as well  as in the scope  for the disbursement  of patronage.
II.  An Economic Model of the  State
Economists  have  traditionally  not had  much  to say about  the theory  of the state.
The view  of the state that  most  commonly  prevails  in economics  is of a 'Yunctional"  or
"instumental" agency  that  performs  the trditional tasks  of providing  public  goods  and  off-
12setting  extemalities  and other  " market  failures"  by corrective  taxes  and subsidies.  In so far
as the state  undertakes  income  redistribution  through  its tax and  expenditure  policy  it is in
relation  to some  ethically  specified  "social  welfare  function".  In the tradition  of Pigou  and
Meade  the state  is seen as a benevolent  guardian  of the public  interest.  Baumol's  Welfare
Economics  and the Theory  of the State  is perhaps  stll the most  explicit  and thorough
statement  of this  approach,  even though  it was written  as early as 1952.
The "public  choice"  theorists,  however,  have  taken a more  cynical  view  of the state
that  sees  it as a grasping  monster,  a Leviathan  that  extracts  revenue  from  its subjects  for the
private  interests  and enjoyment  of the individuals  or groups  in whom  the power  of rule
adheres. Machiavelli  and Hobbes,  rather than  Bentham  and his modern  disciples,  are the
inspiration  of these  writers. What I have  not been  able  to find in the literature,  however,  is
an approach  that  is flexible  enough  to handle  the tension  between  these  two  aspects  of the
state,  the "productive"  and the "predatory".  In the rest of this secdon  I will  present  a model
of the state  that will attempt  to accomplish  this, in the simplest  possible  way. I will then
relate  this model  to the generaWiscussion  of the role of the state  in LDCs  that  was given  in
the previous  section. 5
The productive  role of the state is expressed  in this  model  by the hypothesis  that
public  expenditure  on administration,  law and order,  roads,  justice  and so on acts as an
"externality"  to private  economic  activities,  enhancing  the  priyate  output  from  prvate
inputs. We thus  treat  public  goods  as "intermediate  inputs"  in the  provision  of final  private
goods  rather than  treating  them  as final  goods  in their  own  right.
This idea  iSpnbodied in the following  simple  formal  structure.  Let Y he "national





A' (LgL>  0, A" (Lg) < 0,  A(0) = 1  (3)
where  Lg and Lp are labor  in government  and  private  employment  respectively.
The function  F is of the familiar  neoclassical  type  and  for simplicity  is homogeneous  of the
first degree.
When Lg = 0 and therefore  A(0)  = 1  we get the level  of output  under  anarchy  or the
Hobbesian  "state of nature"  in which  YO  = F [L,K] . As Lg is increased  the marginal
productivity  of a wocker  will be higher  in the  public  than  in the private  sector  and so  output
will  rise initially,  but  then  it will  decline  after  reaching  a maximum  when the  condition
F A'(Lg)  = A (Lg)  FL (Lp)  (4)
is met,  in which  the left hand side is the marginal  product  of labor  in the public
sector  and the right  hand side the marginal  product  of labor  in the private  sector. This
condition  determines  the optimal  allocation  of labor  Lg and Lp  between  the two sectors,
that makes  final output  a maximum  at Y*. The wages  in the two  sectors  would  obviously
have  to be equalized  to achieve  (4),  and so the shadow  price of labor  in the public  sector
will be the margial productivity  of labor  in the  private  sector. The opdmal  level  of public
expenditure  wLg,  where  w denotes  the common  wage,  is then  determined,  and so a
proportional  tax rate t can be calculated  to satisfy
- _  *
t Y  = w Lg  (5)
where w=(l-t)  A  (Lg)FL (Lp)  (6)
Once  state aethority  is vested  in an autonomous  ruler,  however,there  is no
guarantee  that he will bring  society  to this opdmal  allocation.  If the ruler  is conceived  as
"absolute"  in the literal  sense  of the term,  i.e. with  no constraints  at all on his abi;ity  to
secure  his will at the expense  of society,  h  will indeed  find  it in his own  interest  to
maximize  Y by meeting  condition  (4) but  he will then  proceed  to appropriate  the entire
14surplus,  Y* - YO,  above  that  obtainable  by his subjects  in the state  of nature. Hobbes
explicitly  recogniz0 that  there  is nothing  to prevent  his absolute  sovereign  from  proceeding
in this fashion  should  he be so inclined. fhis makes  it difficult  for those  like  C.B.
Macpherson  (1962)  who  sought  to repan1  Hobbes  as the apostle  of "possessive
individualism"  and a "bourgeois  revolution'.
As mentioied in the previous  section,  however,  even  the "absolutist"  monarchs  of
early mo&-es  Europe  did not have  things  all thew  own  way to this  extent,  since  they  were
constained by histoncal  precedents  in the degree  to which  they  could  tax their  subjects  and
otherwise  violate  p.4vate  property  rights. Let us suppose  therefore  that  the monarch  cannot
raise the  tax rate on output  above  mne  specified  level,  which  we can take  to be the t of the
"optimal"  solution  just obtained. In addidon  we assume  that  he cannot  conscript  labour,
ie.  he has to pay any  public  employees  the after-tax  wage  that  they  could  earn  in the
private  sector.
Under  these crcumsnces  a self-interested  ruler  would  choose  Lg so as to
Maximize  S  t A (Lg) F [Lp,K]  - (I - t) A FL Lg  (7)
subject  to (2).
The  necessary condition to achieve this is seen to be
tLFA'(Lg)-A(Lg)FLJ  = (l-t)[A(Lg)FL+Lg (A'(Lg)FL.A(Lg)FLL)]  (8)
The left-hand  side  is the marginal  gain  in the surplus  obtained  by tansferring a
worker  from the privab-  to the public  sector. The right-hand  side  is the marginal  cost  of
doing  this which  is the rise in the cost of public  employment.  Surplus  is maximized  when
these  two magnitudes  are equated. Since  FLL < 0 the right-hand  side  is positive  and
therefore
F A'(Lg) > AQLg)  FL  (9)
which  means  that  surplus  is maximized  when  Lg is IM  than  the optimal  level. The
surplus-maxing  ruler  will  provide  less  than  the optimal  level  of public  services  since  to
15increase  Lg further  would  raise  Y but rduce S. The situation  is conveniently  depicted  in
terms of Figure 1.-
The concave  and  convex  functions  in Figure  1  represent revenue  and public
expenditure  respectively.  The expenditure  function  is convex  since  the wage-rate  is an
increasing  function  of public  expenditure  because  marginal  labor  productivity  in the private
sector rises with rising  public  employment.  Surplus  is the vertical  distance  between  these
functions  at each value  of Lg, and is maximized  where  the slopes  of the two  functions  are
equaL  with Lg equal to OW,  public  expenditure  equal to VW  and surplus  equal to UV.
This surplus  is available  for the consumption  of the ruler  or for disposidon  in any  other
way that  he sees  fit. Public  employment  is thus Iua  than  the socially  optimal  level  of OX,
at which  the final  output  Y is  maximized.
An alternative  possibility  for an autonomous  state  is that  it maximizes  the level  of
public  expenditure,  subject  only to the revenue  constraint.  This hypothesis  is of course  the
one advanced  by students  of bureaucracy  from Parkinson  (1958)  to Niskanen  (1971). In
this case  public  employment  would  expand  to OZ and the surplus  would  be driven  to zero,
the point at wh -h the two  functions  cross. Thus, instead  of public  services  being  too small
as under  the hypothesis  gf surplus  maxiion,  they  could  be too large,  as depicted  in
Figure 1, in the case  of the bureaucratic  hypothesis.
Notice  that  the state  becomes  analogous  to an economy-wide  firm  in our model.
The surplus  maximizing  "absolutist"  state  becomes  like  a "natural  monopoly",  while  the
bureaucratic  case  corresponds  to the "sales  maxtion"  hypothesis  of the "divorce  of
ownership  and  contror' in the modern  corporadon.
These  two hypotheses  of course  only provide  extreme  polar  cases. Any  particular
instance  is likely  to involve  some  level  of public  employment  between  OW and  OZ and
surplus  between  UV  and zero. The surplus  could  be allocated  to any purpose  whatsoever,
worthy  causes  like transfers  to widows  and  orphans  or "rents"  to social  parasites  of various
ypes. A "developmental"  state  could  allocate  it to public  investment.
16Thus far we have  assuming  that  the tax rate and the labor  supply  are both
exogenously  given. It would  clearly  be desirable  to extend  the model  in such a way  that
each  of these  is determined  endogenously  by the maximization  process,  along  with  all the
other  variables  of the system.
In order  to do tis  we first  observe  that  for any tax  rate and labor  supply  the model
already  defmes  a maximized  level of surplus. Furthermore,  it is readily  seen  that surplus  is
increased  by a rise  in either  of these  parameters.  This enables  us to define  a family  of iso-
surplus  contours
S = S(t,L)  (10)
St >0,  SL >0
as indicated  by the curves  SS°, SS* and SS' convex  to the origin  in Figure  2, along
each of which  the naximized  level  of surplus  is constant.
Assume  now  that  labor  supply  is not fixed  but  an  increasing  function  of the after-
tax wage  rate. This gives  rise to the concave  frontier  Tr  depicted  in Figure  2 which
shows  the trade-off  to the state  between  the tax rate  and the labor  supply,  upon  which  the
revenue  base depends,  a higher  tax-rate  having  a negadve  repevrcussion  on the supply  of
labor  and hence on the revenue  base. Although  intuidively  plausible  the frontier  Tr  has to
be derived  from  the model  itself,  and this  can be conveniently  done by use of Figure  3.
The positively  sloped  curve  AA' is simply  the supply  curve  of labor  as a function  of
the after-tax  wage. ITe negatively  sloped  curve  BB' shows  the equilibrium  after-tax  wage
corresponding  to each level  of labor supply,  for a gjn  tax-rate. Thus for any level of
labor supply  and  the tax rate  (which  is constant  at aU  points  on BB')  the model  determines
the surplus-maximizng  allocation  of labor  between  the public  and  private  sctrs  and  hence
the  equilibrium  after-tax  wage. An increase  in the tax rate  reduces  the after-tax  wage  for
each level  of labor  input and so shifts  the BB' curve  to the lekft,  thus  reducing  the
equilibrium  labor  supply. We have  therefore  shown  why the frontier  1T in Figure  2
displays  a negative  relationship  between  the tax-rate  and the labor  supply. The tangency  of
17SS* with  Tr  in Figure  2 determines  the equilibrium  tax-rate  t* and labor  supply  L* for the
surplus-maximizing  case.
The budget-maximizing  "bureaucrtic" version  of the model  can be solved  in
analogous  fashion. Given  the tax-rate  and  labor  supply  the model  already  determines  the
maximized  budget  level,  so that  we can define  the iso-budget  contours
B = B(t,L)  (11)
SB  8B
8t  8L
since  the level of the  budget  is obviously  an increasing  function  of the tax-rate  and
labor  supplies  as well. The frontier  showing  the labor  supply  as negatively  related  to the
tax-rate  can also readily  he obtained  in this case. The supply  curve  of labor  as a positive
function  of the after-tax  wage  in Figure  3 is invariant  to the nature  of the  xmizing
hypothesis  for the state. It is easy to see,  however,  that the negatively  sloped  "demand
curve' for labor  wil lie to the  tight of the corresponding  case  for the surplus-maximizing
hypothesis.  This is because  for any given  tax-rate  and  labor  input the demand  for labor,
and hence  the after-tax  wage,  will be higher  under  the  "bureaucratic"  hypothesis,  as we
have already  seen from  Figure 1. This means  that for any tax-rate  the equilibrium  supply
of labor  will be greater  than  under  surplus  maximization  so that  the frontier  lies outside  that
of the  previous  case. The optimal  point  on the frontier  is where  it is tangential  to the
highest  iso-budget  contour,  Thus the state  "squeezes"  more  resources  out of society  under
the bureaucratic  than  under  the surplus-maximization  hypothesis.
We can now  link the two versions  of the autonomous  state  analyzed  in this section
with the typology  of LDC  states  presented  in the previous  section. The surplus
maximization  case  would  appear  to correspond  to the traditional  monarchies  and traditional
dictatorships.  The ruler  in the first  case has his legitimacy  confered by right  of dynastic
succession  while  in the second  his authority  over civil society  is sufficiently  strong  for him
not to have  to bother  with an extensive  apparatus  of control. In both  cases,  therefore,  it
18would  seen  that therm  could  be limited  government  in the sense  of resource-using  public
services,  but with  a considerable  margin  between  revenue  and the cost of public  services,
which  is available  for the enjoyment  of the ruler  and those  on whom  he chooses  to confer
special  favor  or buy off with bribes.
The authoritarian  states,  on the  other hand,  are dominated  by armies  or parties  that
need to justify their  nrle over society  by the apparent  execution  of grandiose  tasks,  for
which  they  would  seek  to maximize  the available  budgetary  resources. While  key
personnel  would  no doubt  live well  these  would  tend  to be officiaUy  sanctioned  "perks",
rather  than simple  graft though  the line  may  be hard to draw  in many  cases.
Dcmoatic  states  do not  really  fit into the model  since  in this case  the levels  of
public  reve .ue and  public  expenditure  (in the resource-using  sense),  as weU  as who
benefits  from  tansfer payments,  are determined  by electoral  competition.  The situation  is
thus "oligopolistic" rather than "monopolistidc",  as in our simple model. In this case the
more  standard  approach  of the New  Political  Economy  comes  irto its own and  we ha"-'
nothing specific to add here.
III.  Facor  Prolortions.  Trade  Taxesand  the  State
In this section  we will apply  the hypotheses  regarding  the behavior  of the suite  that
have been  discussed  in the previous  section  to models  of a "typical"  LDC economy  to see
whether  they  can generate  outcomes  that  are consistent  with  the "stylized  facts"  of LDC
experience.  Siwc4e  vast majority  of LDC's are  highly  open  economies  we will naturally
stress  the relationship  between  the fiscal  behavior  of the state  and  inermational  trade  and
capital  movements.
(i)  A Viner-Ricardo  Model
In this well-known  model  there  is a primary  sector  producing  output  as a fimction
of labor  and a "specific"  input  called  "land",  but which  can of course  be thought  of as a
19natural  resource  of any kind,  and a manufacturing  sector  that  produces  output with  labor
and another  specific  input  called  "capital",  which  may  be either  exogenously  fixed  or
internationally  mobile  as a function  of the  rate of return  obtainable.  Both  sectors  compete
for the same  homogeneous  labor  pool. Relative  prices  of the two  goods  are fixed  on world
markets  but are of course  internally  variable  as a result  of state  policy.
To begin  with let us suppose  that  capital  is perfectly  mobile  internationally  at an
exogenous  rate of return r.  Assuming  constant  returns  to scale  in the production  function
for manufacturing  this  means  that
f'(km) = -'  (12)
where  km is the capital-labor  ratio  and f(km) is the marginal  productivity  of capital.
From  (1) it follows  that
f(km)  - f(km) km = w  (13)
The externally  fixed  ? thus  determines  km and the real  wage  w in terms  of
manufactures  for the LDC  The allocation  of the  fixed  labor  pool between  the two sectors
is detemined by
p [g(qa)  -g'(qa)  qal = w  (14)
where  g(qa)  is output  per worker  in the agricultural  or pimary sector,  qa is  the
land-labor  ratio  in the sectar and  p is the exogenously  given  world  price  ratio  of the two
goods. Since the total supply  of "land",  specific  to the primary  sector,  is fixed,  qa depends
only on employment  La in that sector. We also  have
La+Lm=L  (15)
and since  J  is uniquely  determined  by (14)  we also  uniquely  determine  Lm. Since
km is determined  by (12)  we therefore  also  know  the endogenous  capital  input Km. This
d is divided  between  an initially  fixed  domestic  component  K:  and the foreign  capital  inflow
K,  which  is
f  d Km = Km -Kmn  (16)
20National  income  would  be
Y=wL+#K,;+pg'(qa)qaLa  (17)
where  the first  term is total wages,  the second  is profits  of domesdcally  owned
capital  and the third  is the natural  resource  rents  of the  prinary sector. Since  the economy
is "small"  in world  markets  Y  represents  the maximum  income  that  domestic  residents  can
obtain  and  therefore  corresponds  to the socially  optimal  level,  if distributive  problems  are
either  ignored  or taken  care  of by the usual  fiction  of non-distortionary  "lump  sum"
transfers.
Into this idyllic  "first best" world  we now  introduce,  like  a serpent  in the garden,
the "autonomous"  state. While  the previous  section  has stressed  the "productive"  role of
the state,  despite  its perversion  to "predatoty"  ends,  in this section  we will simplify  by
assuming  either  that there is already  a pool of resources  set  aside  for public  use, at a level
just sufficient  to sustain  private ictivity  at the opdmal  level,  or more  blatandy  by  just
ignoring  that aspect  of the problem  here  since  it is ifrelevant  to the present  objective.
We will assume,  with good  reason,  that  the state  finds it most  convenient  to tax
taade,  rather than  wealth  or incomes  direcdy. There  is ample  evidence  that  public  finances
in the Third  World  do just this. Since  we are  ignoring  productive  pub'r.^  expenditure
maximizing  surplus  and  maximizing  revenue  are now  equivalent.  It is instructive  to
consider  the popular  device  of a "marketing  boad" to tax the resource-intensive  primary
sector  which  is the source  of the country's  experts  and foreign  exchange  earnings.
The impact  of a revenue-maximizing  marketing  board  on the economy  is illustrated
in Figure  4. The horizontal  axis measures  employment  in the pdmary  sector  and the
vertical  axis  is used  to indicate  the wage  and marginal  product of labor  in this sector,
evaluated  at the world  price p  in terms  of manufactures.  The distance  OW  indicates  the
wage  and the Line  AV is the marginal  productivity  curve  of labor  in the primary  sector
21(drawn  as linear  for convedence  of exposition).  Employment  is equal to OG, the rent from
natural  resources  is the triangle  AWV  and OWVG  is the wage  -bill  in the primary  sector.
The marketing  board  acting  as a maximizing  monopsonist  drives  a wedge  equal  to
ST between  the world  and domestic  prices  of the primary  export,  T being  the point  at
which  the horizontal  wage  line  is intersected  by the line  AT which  is the marginal  revenue
product  curve.  The maximum  revenue  of the marketing  board  is the area  of the  rectangle
UWST. The rents to private  citizens  in the primary  sector  fall to the triangle  AUS,  while
the triangle  STV  is the deadweight  loss to the economy  as a whole  from  the restiictive
policies  of the marketing  board. Employment  in the primary  sector  contracts  to OF, so that
PO workers  are released  to the manufacturing  sector. Addidonal  foreign  capital  will flow
in to employ  these  workers,  who will earn  the same  wage  as before. The returns  to capital,
however,  will not be a part of national  income  since  they  will accrue  to the foreign  owners.
The economy  has become  (a) more  industrialized,  since  the primazy  sector  contracts  and
manufacturing  expands  (b) more  dependent  on foreigp  capital  because  of the additional
induced  inflow  (c) less  wel off than  before  because  of the net loss of real national  income
equal  to the area  of the tiangle STV  (d) restricted  in its  tade  since  the  contraction  of
primary  output is at the expense  of exports,  so that  imports  must decline  as well  because  of
the  decline  in net foreign  eamings.
What does the state  do with its revenue?  There are a number  of possibilities.  Frs,
it could  simply  be enjoyed  as the private  income  of a traditional  monarch  or dictator,  if we
have the frst two  types  of state that  we considered  in the previous  section. Swiss  bank
accounts,  luxury  imports,  construction  of monuments  using some  of the released  labor  are
all possible  uses  of the surplus  each  of which  can be amply  illustrated  by recent  and
contemporary  Third  World  examples.
Alternatively,  if the state  is of a more  modern  authoritarian  type  of either  the left or
the right,  there  could be the establishment  of a public  bureaucracy  that  perhaps  enhances  the
productivity  of the economy  to some  extent  but  which  is more  likely  to be largely  parasitic
22on the civil society,  engaging  itself  on phantom  tasks  defined  in tems of those  old
standbys  such  as national  unity  or security,  development  and  so on. Wages  in the public
sector  could  be above  market  levels,  to reward  friends  and  favorites  or simply  to create
commitments  and  dependence  on the regime.
Another  effect  of the  "squeeze"  on agricultural  rents is that  the price  of the product
is lowered  to domestic  consumers,  an effect  which  is particularly  important  when  the
primary  product  is a food  staple,  such  as rice  in South  East  Asia  or beef  and  wheat  in
Argendna The state  could, of course,  charge  the world  price  to domestic  consumers  and
thus  maximize  its returns  from exports  to the world  market. There  would  be administrative
difficulties,  however,  and besides  there is the substandal  political  benefit  of providing  a
subsidy  to urban  dwellers,  the likeliest  source  of visible  opposition  to the regime. Thus  in
vrually  all known  cases  the benefit  of the squeeze  on the primary  sector  is passed  on to the
domestic  consumers  as an implicit  or even  explicit  subsidy.
The model  is easily  adapted  to the case  of no capital  mobility  at all, or of the  foreign
capital  inflow  being  an increasing  function  of the rate  of return  that  is obtainable  in the
economy. In both cases  the rate of return  becomes  an endogenous  variable,  along  with the
foreign  capital  inflow  in the latter  case. The tax on the  primary  sector  will result  in a
diversion  of the labor  force  into manufacturing,  raising  the rate  of return  and the inflow  of
foreign  capital  into that  sector. Domestic  as well  as foreign  capitalists  are indirect
beneficiaries  of the squeeze  on the primary  sector. Thus the state  would  get an additional
payoff  from the goodwill  that this generates,  which  can of course  be converted  into  revenue
or private  connecuns between  functionaries  and  the relevant  firms. Foreign  and domestic
capital  interact  in complex  ways,  some  competitive  and  some  complementary.  The state
can mediate  these  relationships  to serve  its "own"  purpose  as well  as the private  interests  of
those who  rule in its name.
Finally,  the state  could  use the revenue  that  it obtains  for accumulation  of capital  in
new state-owned  enterprises.  While  these  may  originally  be set up as "statutory  boards"  to
23be run on commercial  principles  they  can soon  become  subject  to use for "politcal"
purposes  as rewards  to the members  of the ruling  elite  or as bribes  to potentally threatening
outsiders  which  may include  army  officers  if these  are  not already  in the inner  circle. A
new  "bureaucratic-bourgeoisie"  can be built  up in this  way, some  of whom  could  establish
private  enterprises  out of the rents that  they  inidally  obtained  from the state.
(ii)  A Heckschr-Ohlin  Mod
Similar  implications  can be derived  fom a Heckscher-Ohlin  model,  with  a state  that
maximizes  its budget  in Parkineson-Niskanen  fashion. We assume  a two-factor,  two-good
"small"  open economy,  with fixed  endowments  of capital  and labor. The export  good  is
labor-intensive  and the import-competing  good  capital-intensive.  Revenue  comes  fiom the
proceeds  of a tariff, the level  of which  is to be determined  endogenously,  along  with the
level of public  employment.
Since  the world  price-ratio  is fixed  the domestic  price-ratio  is uniquely  deternined
by the level  of the taiff.  This  domestic  price-ratio  in tun, by the Stolper-Samuelson
therem, uniquely  determines  the real  wage  and  return  to capitaL Since  imports  are  capital-
intensive the higher  the tariff  the lower  the real  wage  and  the higher  the  return  to capital.
The government's  problem  is to choose  the tariff  rate,  t, and the level  of public
employment,  Lg, in such  a way  as to
Maximize  w(t)  Lg
Subject  to
w(t) Lg S t p* M ( (l+t) p*, Lg)
where  p* is the wJI  price-ratio,  M is the level  of imports  and w(t)  is the wage-rate  which
is a negative  function  of t. The level  of imports  varies  negatively  with  the domestic  price-
ratio, which  is equal  to (1+t)  p*. It also depends  on Lg, since  employment  in the public
sector  withdraws  labor  from the  producion of the two  tradable  goods. With the capital
stock  fixed,  more  public  employment  reduces  the labor  force  in the tadable sector,  and
hence  by the  Rybezynski  theorem  increases  the output  of the  capital-intensive  import-
24competing  good,  and therefore  reduces  the level  of imports  and  hence  tariff  revenue  as
well.  -
The solution  of the problem  is indicated  in Figure  5. The concave  fronder  FF'
shows  the maximum  feasible  w(t)  for any given  value  of Lg. Supposz  Lg at some  positive
level and  the tariff  t at zero. The wage  w(t)  would  then  be at its maximum  free-trade  level
but revenue  would  be zem, so that the government  oudget  constraint  would  be violated.
As the tariff  is increased  w(t) will fall,  so that  expenditure  is reduced,  and  revenue  will be
incrased.  Thus  corresponding  to the given  value of Lg we can find  a taiff t and hence a
wage-rate  w(t) at which  the budget  constraint  is satisfied  with  equality. A higher  value  of
Lg will involve  a lower  revenue  for a given  value  of t, since  the volume  of imports  will be
lower. Hence  we must have a higher  tariff,  and thus  a lower  wage-rate,  at a higher  level of
public  employment. This explains  why  FF is negatively  sloped.
the objective  function  w(t)  Lg can be represented  in Figure  S by a family  of
rectangular  hypebolas. The optimal  point z is where  FF is tangential  to the  highest  of
these,  yielding  the optimal  values  w(t*)  and Lg.
Our hypothesis  of a budget-maximizing  bureaucradc  regime  has thus  determined  the
tariff  level ndoagn*l,  along  with the size of the public  sector  itself  in the setting  of a
small  open economy. More standaid  models  of endogenous  tariffs,  such  as Findlay  and
Wellisz  (1982)  and Mayer  (1984),  postulate  democratic  pluralist  regimes,  less  consistent
with Third  World  reality  and are therefore  more  suited  to conditions  in the advanced
countr.es.  The model  presented  here  is a refinement  of an earlier  version  contained  in
Section  H  of Findla&and  Wellisz  (1983). This model  points  to the possibilities  of a
"bureaucratic-capitalist"  alliance,  that  has often  been  noted  in the Latin  American  context
and which  will be elaboraed  upon  in the potentially  richer  model  in the next  section.
(iii)  An  "Australian"  Model
Finally  let us consider  a model  that  neatly  combines  Viner-Ricardo  and Heckscher-
OhLin  features.  This model  can be found in a paper  by Fred  Gmen and  Max  Corden  (1970)
25and is also used  to good effect  in Anne Krueger's  (1977)  Graham  Lecture. The Australian
connection  of all tee  authors  is responsible  for the appellation  that I have  given  it.
Suppose  we have  two sectors,  a prirary sector  and  a manufacturing  sector,  but
while  the primary  sector  continues  to produce  a single  good,  using  "land" and  labor,
manufacturing  is nov differentiated  between  capital-intensive  and labor-intensive  goods,
both using  capital  and labor. Thus  labor  is used  in all three,  capital  in two  and land  only in
one  of the goods  that  are produced. All endowments  are given  and  relative  prices,  as
before,  are determined  exogenously  on world  markets. In the  absence  of state  intervention
suppose  that technology,  preferences  and  endowments  are such  that  the economy  experts
the primary  good and the labor-intensive  industrial  good  and  imports  the  capital-intensive
good.
Since  the industrial  sector  has a Heckscher-Ohlin  specification  the relative  price of
the two  industrial  goods  on the world  market  would  detenn  the  return  to capital  and the
real  wage. Let us say that the nimerair  is the labor-intensive  good. With the  price of the
primary  export  also given  in terms  of the  nmmie  it is apparent  that employment  in the
primary  sector,  and hence  rent and output,  are all determined  by the equality  of the marginal
product  of labor  with the real wage. This gives  the labor  force  for the indusil  sector  and
hence the production  levels  of both goods  produced  by that  sector. National  income  as
well  as both  relative  prices now  being  given,  domestic  consumption  of each good  can also
be determined  and  hence  the volume  of trade  in all three  goods.
One  of the most  interesting  feature  of this  model,  from a political  economy
standpoint,  is that  iris possible  for a tariff  on industral imports  to benefit  landownnr  To
see this consider  a tariff  on the import  of the capital-intensive  good. By the Stolper-
Samuelson  theorem  again  the real wage  will be lower,  while  the  price  of the primary  good
will be unchanged,  both in terms  of the numeraire.  Thus  the effect  will be to increase
employment,  and hence  rents,  in the primary  sector. All agents  in the  model  will be worse
off as consumers,  because  of the distortion  in domestic  prices  caused  by the tariff, but  it is
26clealy possible  for landowners  to gain  on a net basis. Thus both capitalists  and
landowners  can gain  as a result  of a tariff  on capital-intensive  imports,  while  wokers of
course  are definitely  worse off.
An export  tax on agriculture,  or tie pricing  policies  of a marketing  board,  clearly
depresses  the returns  to this sector  and  reduces  the level  of employment  within  it. The
influx  of labor to the industrial  sector  would,  however,  increase  the output  of labor-
intensive  goods,  while  reducing  the output  of capital-intensive  goods. Real  wages  remain
unchanged  in terms  of the manufactured  goods  but they  in terms  of the primary  good,
since  the intemal  price of that  good  has fallen  as a result  of the policy  of taxing  agriculture.
The decline  in output  of capital-intensive  goods  would  also be accompanied  by an increase
in imports. Protecionist interests  in industry,  together  with the ever-present  dtirst  for
revenue  on the part of the state  could  lead to imposition  of, or a rise in, tariffs  on capital-
intensive  imports. This would  off-set  at least  part of the increase  in real wages  of the
workers  and produce  a rise in the return  to capitaL
The scenario  of the previous  paragraph  has considerable  relevance  to the  case  of
Argentina. 6 That country in its heyday was an "agro-export oligarchy" in which dhe
expansion  of the grain  and beef  exports  produced  by the fertile  =  created  one  of the
most prosperous  societies  in the entire  Southem  hemisphere.  Politics  was dominated  by
the rich landowners  and the professional  urban  middle  class that  arose  as an off-shoot  of
this group. Workers,  who  tended  to be recendy  arrived  immigrants  from Italy  and Spain,
did not succeed  in entening  the political  arena  significandy,  since  the anarchist  and
syndicalist  parties  thjt attempted  to represent  them  were  crushed  by armed  forces  that
reflected  the domination  of the nual magnates  and  the urban  bourgeoisie.  The difficulties
caused  by the  depression  of the thirties  resulted  in military  intervention  of a conservative,
and  even  reactionary  character. The adverse  shift  of the terms  of trade,  and isolation  during
the second  world %  ar, stimulated  the  development  of urban  industry  and thus  expanded  the
very class that  was kept  out of the political  system.
27This situadon  provided  a clear  opportunity  for someone  to capitalize  on by
mobilizing  this latent  political  base. The opportunity  was seized  by Juan Peron  in 1946.
Though  his personal  rule ended  in 1956  Peronism  has become  a permanent  feature  of
Argentine  political  life,  the latest  chapter  of which  has  just opened  with the  victory  at the
polls of Carlos  Menem. The formula  for Peronism  was to squeeze  the primary  sector  by
taxes  and  price controls  that simultaneously  provided  revenue  to the state,  lowered  the cost
of living  of the workers  since  grain  and beef  were such  important  components  of their
consumption  baskets  and also  enabled  tht regime  to gain  credit  by opposing  the landed
"oligarchy"  in the interest  of the common  man. Nationalization  and an expanding
bureaucracy  could also  keep the urban  middle  class happy  by providing  career
opportunies in the  expanded  realm  of the state. Combined  with  the charisma  of Evita
Peron  the formula  was clearly  extraordinarily  effective.
The losers,  however,  particularly  the landowners  and associated  sections  of the
army  as well  as financial  and  industrial  interemsts  were never  defeated  outright  and were  able
to mount  effective  resistance,  particularly  when  the excesses  of the Peronists  combined
with unfavorable  external  developments  produced  crises. This would  bring  waves  of
economic  liberalization  combined  with political  rpreson,  since  the  attempts  to revive
lagging  primary  exports  though higher  relative  prices  were risted  by workers  anxous to
preserve  their real  wages. The Peronist  defeat  of 1956  led to severl orthodox  stabilization
and liberalization  attempts  by Frondizi,  Illia, Ongania  and  others  which  in turn led  to
collapse  and the return  of Peronism  in the early seventies.  The ensuing  chaos  led again  to a
military  regime  andAhe  orthodox  liberalization  measures,  which  again  failed. Like his
Radical  party  predecessors  Frondizi  and Mia,  Raul  Alfonsin  was not able  to defeat
Peronism  at the polls by providing  a workable  economic  framework  and the stage  is
apparendy  set for yet another  turn  of the wheeL
28IV.  Some  Particular &xperiences
In this final section  we attempt  to complement  the somewhat  abstract  chaacter of
the analysis  with some  observations  on experiences  in different  countries  and regions  of the
world There is no particular  principle  underlying  the choices  made,  which  have  been
dictated  partly  by the availability  of relevant  litrature.
(i)  Tske
The case  of Turkey  is a particularly  interesting  one in the  polidcal  economy  of
development.  Among  other  rasons this  is because  of her  early  experience  with  a
"developmental  dictatorship"  under  Mustapha  Kemal  Atatwuk  durng the inter-war  years,
providing  a preview  of many  recent  Third  World  scenarios  of development.  My discussion
is heavily  indebted  to the excellent  historical  study by Keyder  (1987).
The ouiginal  system  of the Ottoman  empire  fits into  our model  of a "surplus-
maximizing"  traditional  monarchy,  with  the surplus  shared  between  the monarch  himself
and the class of state  funcdonaries  that administered  the system. Unlike  Eurpe of the Old
Regime  or Latin  America  there was  no class  of large  landowners,  the soil  being  mainly
worked  by peasants  who  were heavily  taxed. Turkey  was drawn  into the grat expansion
of world  trade from 1870  t  1914  as an exporter  of primary  products,  with  Greek  and
Armenian  merchants  playing  the role  of intmediaies  between  the world  madret  and  the
Turkish  peasant  producers. Needless  to say the state  was not slow  to take  the opportunity
to substantially  inse  its revenue,  thus  leading  to an enhancement  of the traditional
domination  of the bjeaucracy in Turkish  society. Ihe "alien"  merchant  community  was
ceraiy  not able  to challenge  this  hegemony.  The  ravages  of World  War  I and  the
associated  conflicts  with  the Greeks  and  Armenians  led to the almost  total  disappearance  of
the merchant community  as a result  of prsecutdon  and  flight. The twenties  saw a
condnuation  of agricultural  exports  under  the new  regime  of KemaL
29The situation  was drastically  altered  by the impact  of the  Great  Depression.
Relative  prices  turned  very sharply  against  agriculture  and  the stimulus  to industry  that  this
offered  was enhanced  by import  restrictions. A new  class of Turkish  industrialists
emerged,  in close association  with the bureaucracy.  The two forces  merged  in the policy  of
"etatism"  that  characterized  Turkey  from  this  period  on. The inspiration  came  from
Mussolini's  "corporate"  state. The pattern  of industrialization  was of the famdliar  import
substitution  type, with  the boards  of the large  banks  and productive  enterprises  containing
heavy  representation  of the bureaucracy,  many  of whom  also  directly  entered  the field  of
industry. Civil liberties  were suppressed  and  a firm alliance  of "state and  capital"  was
achieved,  with a squeeze  on the agricultural  sector  and the working  class. The situation
thus corresponds  to the models  of the previous  section  of this  paper,  with  relative  prices
turned  against  land  and labor  in favor  of profits  and state  revenue.
The one-parity  state  was abolished  and a democrtic system  established  in 1946
which  eventually  led to the victory  of Menderes  and his Democratic  Party  in 1950. This
liberalizadon  of the  polity  was also accompiried  by economic  changes  that  tuned in the
direction  of market-  oriented  policies.  Combined  with  the boom  in primary  product  pnces
this led to prosperity  of the small  cultivator  class,  who  were also an important  constituency
for the competing  parties. US  foreign  aid and politcal influence  also worked  significantly,
and  perhaps  even  crucially,  in bringing  about  the new  configuration.  The bureaucracy  lost
some  of its primacy  over  economy  and society. The external  environment  however
eventually  tuumd  unfavorable  and the attempt  by Menderes  to sustain  growth  through
inflation  led to disption  that  triggered  a military  coup in 1960  that  restred civilian ule
eventually  but with a new  program  of inport-substitutng  industrialization,  with the
bureaucracy  back  in full force  with a plethora  of planning  agencies  that  allocated  scarce
inputs,  particularly  foreign  exchange,  with  the predictable  "rent-seeking"  consequences.  In
fact Anne  Krueger's  (1974)  original  article  appears  to have  been  based  on her  experience  of
working  in Turkey. Buoyed  by foreign  aid and the large  inflow  of remittances  fom the
30flood of Turkish workers to Western Europe, the system expanded until it was brought to a
crisis by the oil shocks and associated world recession. Violence erupted within civil
society between the extreme right and left, leading to military intervention in 1980. Since
then there has been success with outward-looking  policies leading to a rapid growth of
manufactured exports.  It remains to the seen, however, whether "bureacmratic
authoritaianism" in Turkey will follow the East Asian rather than the Latin American
pattern.
(i  India
India, like Turkey and Iran, is a successor state to the three great "gunpowder
empires 'of  the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals. The long British colonial interlude
modenized the traditional bureaucratic system and left a democratic pariamentay  regime
as its legacy. The question therefr  e arises as to whether the modern Indian polity
functions as an "autonomous" centralized state insulated from the pressures of civil society
or whether it is best looked upon as a pluralistic democracy of the Western type,
distinguished only by a lower standard of living from its Western European and North
American counteparts.
Bardhan (1984), in a brief but stimulating study of the political economy of Indian
development, begins with the hypothesis of the relative autonomy of the post-colonial  state,
building on the heritage of the Mughals and the scarcely less imperial British vicemys. He
points out that the Nehru generation's authority, derived from its leadership or the
independence struggle, enabled the Indian state initialy to impose a particular pattern of
development, stressjg  the role of the public sector in bringing about a "socialistic pattern
of society" while raising per capita incomes. He argues, however, that the subsequent
generations of the Nehru dynasty have increasingly yielded to pressures from three main
groups -- big industrialists and the bureaucracy  in the cities and large farmers in the rual
areas. The result, although Bardhan does not draw this conclusion, seems to me to be
31hardly distinguishable from t.  kind of "chumning"  redistributive state that we are familiar
with in the more developed countries.
The combination of an extremely extensive role for the state, with sweeping control
over finance, industry, transport and trade, together with an "open" polity that is subject to
lobbying pressures from almost any organized interest group has resulted in disappointing
growth performance over the last two decades, despite some successes in agriculture. The
"surplus" has tended to be frittered away in subsidies to farmers and inefficient state
enterprises, while an expanding bureaucracy continues its lucrative hegemony over a
labyrinthine maze of regulations and controls. No substandal free enterprise coalition has
been able to form to push back the frontiers of the state from its control over key sectors,
while the bureaucracy is always able to undermine tentative attempts by the leadership to
liberalize the system The dependence of the ruling party on contributions from "rent-
seeldng" lobbies also imparts stability to the existing structure. Gunnar Myrdal's well-
known complaint about the "soft state" in India is related to this tendency to be unable to
insulate itself from these intrusions and to pursue its "higher  developmental  objectives. 7
Despite all these disappointments about Idia  not fulfilling  the outstanding potential
for development provided by her entrepreneurs nd diverse base of human capital, it
remains a remarkable achievement  to have maintained such a vibrant and stable demoraic
regime for so long when so many of her neighbors have fallen into dictatorial nrle.
32(iii) Afra
The moderof a marketing  board  in a Viner-Ricardo  economy  presented  earlier  fits
African  experience  remarkably  well. 8 The institution  of the marketing  board,  particularly  in
West Africa,  owed  its origin  to the colonial  regimes  which  built  up large  surpluses  from
their  opeation during  the Second  World  War  and the period  preceding  independence.  In
the case  of cash crops such as cocoa,  coffee,  sugar,  sisal,  groundnuts  and so on, and in
particular  when  the producers  are  peasant  small  holders,  they  are natural  victims  of the
predatory  state  that we have  analyzed.  Our general  equilibrium  model  also  simultaneously
accounts  for the induced  bias in favor  of urban  industry  and  capital,  as well  as for the
diversion  of the rents to the ruling  elite,  popularly  known  as the WaBenzi,  the Mercedes-
Benz  tribe,  in much of Africa.
The "exceptions  which  prove  the rule" are also  interesting  to note,  the Ivory Coast
and Kenya. In both  these states  an indigenous  planter  class  was an important  part of the
independence  movement  that took  over power. Felix  Houphouet-Boigny,  in fact, was co-
founder  and president  of the Syndicat  Agricole  Africain,  an organization  devoted  to the
interests  of indigenous  planters,  many  of whom  were from his tribe,  the Baould. 9 It is
therefore  not surprising  that  in these  cases  the independent  African  state  has done well  by
permitting  export  agriculture  to flourish,  and  allowing  foreign  participation.  The  benefits
of development  can still  be channelled  toward  the ruling  elite,  in these  cases,  but in a more
"efficient"  or 'radonar"  manner  from  the standpoint  of the  functioning  of the system  as a
whole.
The works  Robert  Bates (1972,  1983)  has provided  excellent  analysis  and
documentation  of the political  economy  logic  of agricultural  pricing  policies  in Africa  in a
spirit  that is entirely  consistent,  so far as I can see,  with that  of the approach  taken  here.
(iv) Ladn  Anria
Latin  America  presents  the greatest  variation  in economic  and  political  experience  in
the Third  World,  not only because  of diversity  in resource  base and social  structure,  but
33because  of its longer  history  of independence.  Discussions  of this experience  have  tended
to identify  thrce  bmad  phases  or stages  in the  development  of most of the countries  of the
region. These  are (i) An "oligarchic"  phase  of domination  by a landowning  elite,  with an
economic  orientation  geared  to the export  of land-intensive  primary  products  to the  world
market. (ii) 'Populism", a regime  in which  a charismatic  leader  such  as Peron  in
Argentina  or Vargas  in Brazil  adopts  more  nationalisdc  economic  policies,  stressing
industrialization  and  import  subsdtudon,  restrictive  measures  against  the former
"oligarchs",  redistribution  in favor  of the "popular  classes"  and their  incorporation  into the
polidcal  arena. (iii) "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism,'  a term  coined  by the Argentine
political  scientist  Guillermo  O'Donnell,  in which  there  is an alliance  between  the upper
echelons  of the military  and civilian  bureaucracy,  foreign  capital  in the s:.ape  of
multnaional corporations  and "advanced"  sectors  of domestic  industry.  This type  of
regime  attempts  to follow  "liberal"  economic  policies  in the macro  economic  sphere,  though
it is concerned  with  the continuation  and  indeed  the further  promotion  to "deeper"  levels  of
import  substituting  industrialization.  Politically  it is repnessive  and  "exclusionary"  towards
mass participation,  since  this is regarded  as disruptive  of orderly  progress.l1
Again,  it seems  that  our models  are well  adapted  to embody  the features  of each of
these  different  politico-economic  "regimes". The technocatic  bias  and  orientation  of the
bureaucracy  is consistent  with our "budget-maximizing"  version  of the autonomous  state.
The alliance  between  the bureaucracy  and foreign  and  domestic  capital  emerges  clearly  in
our Heckscher-Ohlin  and  "Australian"  models. This  last model  is also  able to capture  the
relationships  betwean  different  interest  groups  - the landowners,  workers,  "advanced"
industry  as represented  by the capital-intensive  manufacturing  sector  as distinct  from  labor-
intensive  industry,  and of course  the state  itself. The model  could  also be adapted  to handle
differentiation  within  the primary  sector,  between  large-scale  land-intensive  production  of
livestock  say and subsistence  production  in a labor-intensive  peasant  sector. "Dualistic"
societies  such as Peru  and Bolivia  could  be analyzed  in corresponding  terms.
34(v)  The Far Eastern  NlCs
The four  Far Eastern  NICs -- Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore  and Hong  Kong have
clearly  been  the star  performers  in the development  field  over the  last two  decades  or more.
It is therefore  a question  of particular  importance  as to what,  if anything,  the New  Political
Economy  can contribute  towards  an understanding  of the reasons  for their success. In this
connection  it is not enough  simply  to point  out that  they  have  been  just about  the only
group  of LDCs  to have  made a systematic  and sustained  commitment  to "outward
orientation"  in their  economic  policies.  In fact  the crucial  political  economy  question  is
precisely  why this is so.
Certainly  the major theme  of the present  paper,  the "relative  autonomy"  of the state,
continues  to hold in this  case. By comparison  with say India,  or even  Brazil,  the state and
its economic  policy  apparatus  has been  "insulated"  from the  pressures  of lobbies  and
special  interests  in all four  cases  - military  dictatorships  in two,  a dominant-party  state  in
another  and British  "guardians"  in the case of Hong Kong. Thus the subsidies,  transfers,
regulations  and bureaucratic  proliferation  that  have  shackled  the Indian  entrepreneurs  have
either  been  absent  or channelled  towards  export  performance.  Except  in the case  of Hong
Kong  this has certainly  not meant  laissez  faim but  it has meant  the ability  of the state  to
pursue  a sustained  strategy  of export-led  growth."I
But if Korean  and KMT  Chinese  generals  have succeeded  because  of the autonomy
of the states  that they  have  set  up why  not  the Latin  American  juntas or the legion  of
African  soldiers  ranging  in rank from field  marshal  to master  sergeant  that  have  taken  over
control  of their socieies? In the case  of the African  countries  one  could  perhaps  say that
the levels  of physical  and social  infrastructure  are as yet inadequate  for a policy  of growth
based  on labor-intensive  manufactured  exports,  and  that the temptation  to squeeze  the
natural  resource-based  export  sectors  is too strong. In Latin  America  the infrastructure  is
available  in many cases  but the  military  is itself  too caught  up in the complex  antagonisms
of civil society,  which  has a richer  texture  than  in the Far Eastern  cases,  to follow  a
35sustained  path  of export  orientadon. Chile  is close  to becoming  the "exceptlon  that proves
the rule"  in this  regard since  the long  period  in which  the Pincochet  regime  has been  abie  to
function  has enabled  it to eventually  embark  on a successful  economic  course. It is very
much  to be hoped  that  the imminent  restoration  of democracy  will not  cause  a setback  in the
development  of the economy.
I  The flavor  of the New  Political  Economy  reseach is perhaps  best conveyed  by the voltunes  of
readings  edited  by Buchanan,  Tollison  and Tullock  (1980),  Collander  (1984)  and Stigler  (1988).
Analytical  surveys  of essential  issues  and  results  are provided  by Bhagwati  (1982),  Srinivasan  (1985)
and  Wellisz  and Findlay  (1988).
2  See her Introduction  to Evans,  Rueschmeyer  and Skocpol,  ag. (1985).
3  Discussions  of the autonomy  of the state  from the Marxist  perspective  can be found  in Miliband
(1977)  and Elster  (1985),  while  Anderson  (1974)  is the most impessive appication  of the Marxist
approach  in a specific  historical  context,  the "absoludst"  states  of early modan Europe. A
stimulating  and original  conceptu  analysis  of the stab is de Jasay  (1985).
4  The subsequent  dscussion draws  on Badie  and Birnbaum  (1983)  and  Poggi  (1978).
5  The model  presented  here  is a significant  extension  over  an earlier  version  contained  in Fmdlay  and
Wilson  (1987),  since  the tax rate is now  endogeaous,  with  the labor  supply  an increasing  function  of
the after-tax  wage insteadof being  perfectly  inelastic. The model  draws  on the insights  into the
"productive"  chart  of the state  contained  in North  (1981),  chapter  3, on "A Neoclassical  Theory  of
the State"  and into  its "edatory"  aspect  by Brennan  and Buchnan (1980). The  prdoy  nature  of
the state is also stressed  in Lal (1985)  and Ttily  (1985). None  of these  authors  however  have
attempted  to embody  their ideas  in a formal  general  equilibrium  model,  even  a very  simple  one such
as is given here.
6  On modem  Argentine  economic  history  see the classic  study  of Diaz  Alejandro  (1970). A convenient
summary  of political  developments  in welation  to the economic  background  is provided  in chapter  3
of Skidmore  and Smith (1984). The  present  effort at attempting  to model  this hisoWical  experience
is also  indebted  to Lal (1986).
7  See Myrdal  (1968). For a brief  but incisive  evaluation  of Indian  economic  performance  and  policy
see also Bhagwati  (1987).
8  For a penetrating  summary  of African  experience  with  respect  to marketing  boards  see Bauer  (1987).
9  See the chapter  on the Ivory  Coast  in Dunn,  ed. (1978).
10  See  O'Donnell (1979),  Collier,  ed. (1979)  and  Evans  (1979)  for analyses  of thc role of the state in
Latin  American  developmenL
11  See Findlay  (1988)  and references  cited therein  on the polidcal  economy  of exportoriented  growth.
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